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Social Security Discrimination Against
African-Americans: An Equal
Protection Argument
by
GEOFFREY T. HoLTz*
Introduction
The Social Security Act ("the Act") was passed in 19351 in order
to alleviate the problems associated with an expanding elderly popula-
tion and the difficulties such persons were encountering in trying to
take care of themselves financially. 2 As with any insurance program,
Social Security was established on the assumption that more partici-
pants would pay into the system than were expected to be paid out
from the system.3 This assumption was based on the fact that when
the first Social Security checks were mailed in 1940, only 54 percent of
the men and 61 percent of the women who paid Social Security taxes
could expect to celebrate their 65th birthdays and start collecting ben-
efits.4 And even those lucky enough to reach retirement age could
only expect to collect benefits for an average of fourteen years before
dying.5
However, these figures tell only half the story. African-Ameri-
cans, as a group, have never received a proportionate share of the
benefits paid out of the Social Security trust fund compared to the
taxes they have paid in.6 While the original Social Security Act of
1935 contained a number of provisions designed explicitly to exclude
* J.D. Candidate 1997; B.A. 1992, California State University, San Diego.
1. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
2. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 642 (1937) (discussing the purposes of the
Social Security Act).
3. See, eg., Nancy J. Altman, The Reconciliation of Retirement Security and Tax Poli-
cies: A Response to Professor Graetz, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1419, 1429-30 (1988).
4. See George 3. Church & Richard Lacayo, Social Insecurity, TnvM, Mar. 20, 1995, at
24, 28.
5. Id. At age 65, men had a life expectancy of 78 years, women 80 years.
6. See infra notes 24-25.
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African-Americans, 7 the current discrepancy is due primarily to the
fact that African-Americans have a significantly lower life expectancy
than white Americans. 8 Since all workers pay into Social Security at
the same rate,9 but become eligible for full benefits only upon reach-
ing age 65,10 the lower life expectancies of African-Americans result
in the program serving as a wealth transfer from black to white
Americans.1
This Note argues that this discriminatory effect of the Social Se-
curity Act,12 when considered along with the purposefully invidious
race-based motivations underlying the origins of the Act, violates the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.13 This Note also proposes a number of solutions-both
judicial and legislative-to the racial inequalities inherent in the Act.
Part I describes the discriminatory impact of the Social Security
Act on African-Americans and demonstrates congressional indiffer-
ence to the problem in recent and proposed legislative amendments to
the Act.
Part II argues that the Act violates the Constitutional guarantees
of equal protection and should therefore be struck down by the
7. See infra notes 74-86.
8. The life expectancies for white and black male infants born in 1990 are 72.7 years
and 64.5 years, respectively. The life expectancies for white and black females born that
year are 79.4 and 73.6, respectively. U.S. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics of
the United States (annual), reported in U.S. Dep't of Com., STATISTCAL ABSTRACr OF THE
UNrrED STATES, tbl. No. 115, at 87 (1994).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 3101, 3111 (1995). Given that there is an earnings cap, how-
ever, with wages over that cap not taxed under Social Security, low-income earners actu-
ally pay a higher rate than do those with incomes over the cap. 42 U.S.C. § 430 (1995).
10. This retirement age is scheduled to be raised to age 67 for those Americans born
after 1960. 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1)(E) (1995).
11. See The '80s in Black and White, ORANGE COUNT R G., July 28, 1992, at B8.
Note that this criticism could be made for any identifiable group who has a lower than
average life expectancy, such as smokers or the poor. However, these groups do not re-
ceive the same treatment under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence as do those
individuals who are members of a "protected class" based on immutable characteristics
such as race or gender. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24
(1973) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality be-
tween the wealthy and the poor). Furthermore, it is unlikely that a member of such a
group could prove the requisite intent for finding an equal protection violation. See supra
text accompanying notes 3-9.
12. Although this note addresses only the Social Security system, the discriminatory
effects and problems addressed are equally applicable to other retirement benefit pro-
grams such as Medicare or state pension plans.
13. The Fifth Amendment reads in pertinent part, "No person shall be... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Supreme Court has inferred an equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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courts. Section A of Part II summarizes the United States Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence in situations where the enact-
ment or administration of a legislative act has given rise to statistical
racial discrepancies. Section B of Part II then reviews the racially dis-
criminatory history of the Social Security Act and applies the facts of
the particular inequality currently engendered by the Act to the
Court's equal protection framework.
Part III discusses possible congressional responses to the prob-
lem. Section A of Part III considers a race-based amendment to the
Social Security Act in light of recent Supreme Court cases concerning
racial and gender preferences, and applies the facts of the Social Se-
curity inequalities to that body of law. Section B of Part III then re-
views a number of possible race-neutral congressional responses to
the racial discrepancies of the current Act. This section urges that
given the constitutional mandate for equal protection under the laws,
Congress can, and must, consider the effects of any proposed amend-
ments to Social Security on remedying the current adverse impact of
the Act on African-Americans.
I. The Discriminatory Impact of Social Security on
African-Americans
A. Life Expectancies of White Americans and African-Americans
African-Americans have a significantly lower life expectancy than
white Americans.' 4 The reasons for this discrepancy are uncertain
and the proffered explanations are varied-among the possibilities
suggested by commentators are that African-Americans suffer gener-
ally higher poverty rates, 15 are more likely to engage in backbending
labor,16 have comparably higher rates of illness and disability,' 7 and
are more prone to the effects of street violence.' 8
The actuarial tables illustrate the stark results of these phenom-
ena. A white male infant born in 1990 can expect to live to an age of
72.7 years.' 9 His black male counterpart, however, will live, on aver-
14. See actuarial data infra Part IA.
15. See Allen L. Otten, People Patterns, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1988, at 37.
16. William E. Gibson, Medicare, Social Security Cuts Collapse, FT. LAUDERDALE
SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 15, 1994, at 1A.
17. Sarah Pekkanen, SSA Commissioner Takes Aim at "Myths," Politics Behind Ru-
mor of Inadequate Funds, King Says, BALT. EVE. SUN, Mar. 5, 1992, at 1A.
18. Jack Germond & Jules Witcover, Tax-Cut Stampede Kills Serious Budget Reform,
BALT. SUN, Dec. 15, 1994, at 2A.
19. U.S. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics of the United States (annual),
and Monthly Vital Statistics Reports, reported in U.S. Dep't of Com., STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl. No. 115, at 87 (1994).
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age, to the age of 64.5.20 The life expectancies for white and black
females born that year are 79.4 and 73.6 years, respectively.21 This
difference in the longevity of African-Americans and whites has been
fairly consistent throughout the twentieth century, even as the life ex-
pectancies of all Americans have steadily increased. In 1935, for ex-
ample, the year that the Social Security Act was passed, 22 white and
black males born that year could expect to live to 61.0 and 51.3, re-
spectively, while white and black females could expect to live to 65.0
and 55.2.23 Thus, from the moment the Social Security Act was passed
until the present, glaring discrepancies have existed in the numbers of
whites and African-Americans who actually live to retirement age.
B. The Effects of Life Expectancy Differences on Social Security Benefits
Full Social Security benefits are scheduled to be paid upon reach-
ing age 67 for those Americans born after 1960.24 The effect of the
eight-year difference in life expectancies between black and white
men is magnified by the fact that an individual must survive to at least
retirement age before becoming eligible to collect from the system.
Thus, even assuming the longer life expectancies of those born in
1990, the average African-American male will die two-and-a-half
years before the age at which he can receive full benefits. The average
white male, however, will live past retirement age and receive benefits
for 5.7 years. In pure dollar terms, the average black male will die
before receiving a single dollar in benefits, while the average white
male will receive $42,800.25 The discrepancy for females is similar,
20. Id.
21. Id. This Note uses the life expectancies of African-Americans and whites for com-
parison primarily because these data are less readily available for other racial and ethnic
groups, particularly for prior decades. In addition, while the discriminatory impact of the
Social Security Act exists for many ethnic groups which have a lower than average life
expectancy rate, the only group which has suffered from intentional discrimination under
the Act, a critical element of equal protection jurisprudence, is African-Americans. See
infra text accompanying notes 51-70.
22. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397(f) (1995)).
23. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, annual reports, and Vital Statistics of the
United States (annual), reported in U.S. Dep't of Com., STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF THE
UNrED STATES, tbl. No. 62, at 58 (1960).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1)(E) (1995). Reduced benefits are available at age 62. 42
U.S.C. § 402(a)(3)(B) (1995). Full benefits are available at age 65 for those born before
1936, with a sliding scale for those born between 1936 and 1960. 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1)
(1995).
25. This figure assumes the average 1991 monthly Social Security benefit for retirees
of $629. Given that this average figure includes payments to men and women, and that
men generally receive higher payments due to their higher lifetime earnings, the black-
white discrepancy is actually even greater. See Social Security Bulletin, reported in U.S.
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with the typical African-American woman expected to receive bene-
fits for 6.6 years compared to 12.4 years for whites.
While the courts and Congress have given little attention to this
situation,26 some commentators in the mainstream press have noted
the problem. Columnist Walter Williams observes, "The only official
racism left in America is Social Security racism.... It's a racial rip-
off; they know I'm going to croak eight months before eligibility starts
and the white guy is going to get at least eight years or so of bene-
fits." 27 The National Caucus on the Black Aged recognized the prob-
lem as far back as 1970 and urged Congress to take racial differences
in life expectancy into account in amending the Social Security Act.28
Some generally conservative sources have also proven sympathetic to
the problem, with the Orange County (CA) Register editorializing
that the current system "is a massive robbery from black taxpayers to
white recipients. ' 29 Even commentator and two-time presidential
candidate Pat Buchanan has acknowledged this discrepancy.30
Official Social Security acknowledgment of the problem has been
scant, however. In a classic glass-is-half-full argument, Robert Myers,
the former chief actuary of Social Security, observed that his tables
show that 50.1% of African-American males born today will make it
to age 67, so it's "certainly not a total washout.131 Others have sug-
gested that, with higher mortality rates, at least African-Americans
will receive a disproportionate amount of survivor benefits. 32 Survi-
vor benefits are available, however, only to the surviving spouse and
minor children of deceased workers, are much smaller than regular
benefits, and at any rate are not disproportionately paid out to Afri-
can-Americans.3 3 Social Security Commissioner Gwendolyn S. King
Dep't of Com., STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNiTED STATES, tbl. No. 583, at 377
(1994).
26. See infra notes 36-42, 75-101.
27. Walter Williams, Little Abuses Add Up to Height of Injustice, CINCnMNATI EN-
OUMER, Nov. 20, 1994, at F3.
28. Jacquelyne Johnson Jackson, Social Security Should Be a True Insurance Program,
DURHAM HERALD-SUN, Nov. 29, 1994, at A8.
29. The '80s in Black and White, supra note 11, at B8.
30. See John Hanchette, Sharp Tongue, Quick Wit, Could Come Back To Haunt
Buchanan, GANNETar NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 26, 1992 (quoting Pat Buchanan).
31. Spencer Rich, Inside" Health and Human Services, Senior Aide May Leave Post
He's Held Less than a Year, WASH. PosT, July 15, 1985, at A13.
32. See id; see also David L. Randall, Who's Subsidized?, Cii. TRrB., Mar. 16,1990, at
24.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d), (e), (f); see Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love:
Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 68 (1996) (observing that survivor benefits
are unavailable to the children of a woman who was never married; she must rely on less
generous AFDC benefits). 68.1% of African-American children were born to unmarried
mothers in 1992 compared to 22.6% of white children. U.S. Dep't of Com., STATISTICAL
ABsRAcr OF Trm UNrrED STATES, tbl. No. 94, at 77 (1995). Thus, it is unlikely that Afri-
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bravely but inexplicably asserts that "[i]t is precisely because of the
African-American mortality rates, it is because of the comparably
high rates of illness and disability... that Social Security is such a
critically important program for black Americans. '34
Social Security is a two-stage program: before retirement age
working Americans pay into the program; after retirement, they are
then paid from the system. African-Americans are affected adversely
by this system on both ends. On the pay-in side, Social Security taxes
are regressive in that they take a greater percentage of the earnings of
low-income taxpayers-a group that includes a disproportionate
number of African-Americans-than from high-income taxpayers.3 5
On the pay-out side, after retirement, Social Security is highly pro-
gressive; recipients with lower lifetime incomes receive a greater pro-
portion of their earnings than do those with higher lifetime incomes.36
Thus, the progressive pay-out side would essentially make up for the
regressive pay-in side of Social Security if all Americans lived the
same number of years past retirement. But, as seen above in Part IA,
this is not the case, and the lower life expectancies of African-Ameri-
cans rob them of this benefit. In short, since African-Americans on
average do not live as long after retirement as do white Americans,
they never reap the benefits of the progressive pay-out system even
though they suffer the inequalities on the regressive pay-in side.
C. Congressional Failure To Confront the Life Expectancy Differences
Although life expectancy differences between black and white
Americans have been significant since the original enactment of the
Social Security Act in 1935,37 in amending the Act Congress has con-
tinued to treat all taxpayers as equally situated.38 For example, since
the 1970s, retirement benefits have included automatic annual cost of
can-American children could receive a disproportionate amount of Social Security survivor
benefits, although they may receive a disproportionate share of AFDC.
34. Pekkanen, supra note 17.
35. This is due to three features of the program. First, Social Security taxes are im-
posed only on wages, and thus exclude unearned investment income which is more likely
to be earned by higher-income taxpayers. Second, Social Security is taxed at a flat rate,
with no deductions or exemptions as with income taxes. Third, Social Security taxes are
only imposed on the first $65,000 of income, resulting in lower-income earners paying a
higher total percentage of their earnings. Jonathan Berry Forman, Promoting Fairness in
the Social Security Retirement Program: Partial Integration and a Credit for Dual-Earner
Couples, 45 TAX LAW. 915, 928 (1992); 42 U.S.C. §§ 415(a)-415(e) (1995). The median
family income of African-Americans in 1992 was $21,161, while that of whites was $38,909.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P60-184.
36. Forman, supra note 35, at 935; 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1995).
37. See supra notes 22-23.
38. As this Note illustrates infra in section UIB, there is much evidence that this failure
indicates intentional racism.
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living adjustments,39 which assist those who have reached retirement
age, but do nothing for the disproportionate number of African-
Americans who do not. During the Social Security funding crisis of
the early 1980s, the congressional response was to dramatically raise
the tax rate, exacerbating the regressive effects of the pay-in side of
the program.40
Recent changes to the program indicate a continued lack of con-
cern for the black-white discrepancies. For example, the 1983 amend-
ments to the statutes raised the retirement age from 65 to 67,4 1 which
markedly increased the racial gap in the number of post-retirement
years in which one could collect benefits. In addition, Senators Bob
Kerry and John Danforth have proposed further raising the retire-
ment age to 70, a revision that would only continue to compound this
problem.42 While it may be true that changes in Social Security are
necessary to maintain the solvency of the program,43 future modifica-
tions should take into account the effects on African-Americans and
other minorities. Some possible legislative remedies are discussed be-
low in Part IIIB.
H. A Judicial Response to the Discriminatory Effect
As demonstrated above, Congress appears to have shown little
concern for the discriminatory impact of Social Security on African-
Americans. The current system favors whites over African-Ameri-
cans, and the proposed changes to the law will only continue and exac-
erbate this inequality.44 It is the province of the courts to minimize
39. Social Security Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, 87 Stat. 947 (1973)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (1973)).
40. The 1983 amendments raised the employee's tax rate from 5.08% for 1980 wages
to 6.20% for 1990 wages. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat.
65 (1983). In fact, these higher rates arguably have pushed more lower-income taxpayers
into greater poverty, a factor which may contribute to lower life expectancy in the first
place. For example, in part because of rising Social Security taxes, the total federal tax
burden on a family of four at the poverty line rose from 1.8% of income in 1979 to 10.4%
by 1985. The Next Tax Reform, Tim Nuw REPuBLic, Sep. 15 & 22, 1986, at 5.
This method of increasing revenue will ultimately lead to tax rates that are even more
crippling. Once the baby boom generation starts to retire en masse in the near future, if
benefits are maintained at today's levels those entering the work force today will have to
pay at least 33% of their income into Social Security, according to the CATO Institute.
Social Security: Prospects for Real Refonn, NAT'L J., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1917.
41. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
42. Robert A. Rosenblatt, Social Security is Target of Plan to Control Deficit, L.A.
Timms, Dec. 10, 1994, at Al.
43. For more on this issue, see infra note 129.
44. See supra notes 36-42. It might be noted that these racial discrepancies are also
sure to be amplified by an additional demographic development: the percentage of non-
whites among younger, tax-paying Americans is sure to increase in coming decades due to
immigration and other factors. In 1992, for example, 68.6% of 5-13 year-olds were non-
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such inequalities by defining the limits by which the democratically
elected legislature can act and by protecting the rights of the minority
to be free from the "tyranny" of the majority.45
Section II of this Note will summarize the current framework of
the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence as it pertains to
this problem. Then, it will apply the facts of the discriminatory nature
of the Social Security Act to this framework and argue for striking the
Act as violative of the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A. The Current State of Equal Protection Jurisprudence-The
"Purpose" Requirement
The principle of equal protection under the laws is a guarantee
that no person will suffer intentional and arbitrary discrimination in
the administration of a law. Professor Laurence Tribe observes that
under equal protection principles, "[t]he Constitution may be of-
fended not only by individual acts of racial discrimination, but also by
government rules, policies or practices that perennially reinforce the
subordinate status of any group. '46 While action by the states is gov-
erned under the explicit Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution,47 federal legislative actions, such as
the Social Security Act, are governed under the penumbral equal pro-
tection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.48
While the discriminatory impact of the Social Security Act on Af-
rican-Americans is clear,49 this impact alone is insufficient to make
out a claim of an equal protection violation. As the Supreme Court
made explicit in Washington v. Davis in 1976, "our cases have not em-
braced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard
hispanic whites, compared to 79.6% of 44-49 year-olds. U.S. Dep't of Com., STA-TisTcAL
ABSTRACr OF T=E UN TED STATES, tbl. Nos. 20-21, at 20-21 (1994). The proportion of
whites among the elderly, however, will remain roughly the same until several decades
later. Since Social Security benefits are paid out of the taxes of current workers, this will
effect an additional transfer of wealth from the increasingly non-white young to the white
elderly.
45. ROBERT H. BorK, THE TEmPTING OF AMERICA 39-41 (1990).
46. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTTIONAL LAW 1516 (2d ed. 1988).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) ("[This] Court's approach
to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."). See also Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (stating that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
contains an equal protection component).
49. See supra notes 14-23.
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to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitu-
tional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. ' '50
Washington v. Davis involved a challenge to a written personnel
test for District of Columbia police officer recruits.5 1 The plaintiffs,
two African-Americans who had failed the test, claimed the exam was
racially discriminatory in violation of their Fifth Amendment equal
protection rights because a disproportionate number of African-
Americans failed this test.52 They argued that the Constitutional
equal protection analysis should be the same in that case as that for
employment discrimination cases decided under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in which discriminatory intent is irrelevant.5 3 The
critical inquiry under Title VII is whether the employment test dispro-
portionately affects an identifiable group such as African-Americans,
absent proof that the test is related to job performance.5 4 The Court
rejected the challenge, observing that the standard for adjudicating
equal protection claims is not the same as for Title VII claims.5 5 The
Court required a showing of discriminatory purpose behind legislation
to hold an act unconstitutional; a mere showing of some disparity in
the impact of a law on certain groups proved insufficient.5 6 The rea-
soning is that nearly every piece of legislation will affect one group
differently from another, and the court is unwilling to micro-manage
Congress by rendering suspect every such statute when the legislature
acts without racial motivation and otherwise rationally.5 7
However, a discriminatory impact on African-Americans such as
can be shown with Social Security is still of important consequence in
equal protection analysis. In Washington v. Davis, while holding that
impact, standing alone, was not enough to make out a successful
claim, the Court added that "[d]isproportionate impact is not irrele-
50. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (emphasis added).
51. l at 233.
52. lId
53. Id. at 236-37. See also Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
54. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. at 132.
55. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
56. 1& The "purpose" requirement must be met even when a statute explicitly makes
certain classifications, unlike the Social Security Act, which are facially neutral. See Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (noting that in "the area of economics and
social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect"). See also Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (reaffirming the Washington v. Davis "pur-
pose" requirement). In that case, the plaintiffs had challenged a local municipal decision
not to grant a request to rezone certain property from a single family to a multi-family
classification for the purposes of building low-income housing. Id. at 254. Although the
failure to rezone disproportionately impacted racial minorities, who comprised 40% of the
eligible tenants for the proposed housing, the Court found no evidence of discriminatory
purpose and, consequently, no violation of the Equal Protection Clause. I& at 269-71.
57. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548-49 (1972).
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vant" in making out a claim of intentional discrimination.58 In fact, a
showing of impact alone has sometimes sufficed for the Court to infer
purposeful discrimination in the enactment or administration of laws.
For example, in a number of cases the Court has accepted statistical
disparities as prima facie proof of an equal protection violation in the
selection of a jury venire.59 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot the Court found
that an alteration of city boundaries that excluded 395 out of 400
black voters was "tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathe-
matical demonstration" that the State acted with a discriminatory pur-
pose.60 And in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the plaintiff's showing that none
of the over 200 Chinese applicants for a municipal laundry permit
were successful, while nearly all white applicants were granted a per-
mit, was sufficient to find a constitutional violation.6'
Although a showing of clear, adverse impact is relevant, the
Court will not strike down a law on equal protection grounds absent
some proof of purposeful discrimination, and the Court is unlikely to
infer such intent solely from the racial disparities in the administration
of Social Security noted above in Part IA. The Court confronted a
similar set of statistics in the 1987 case of McCleskey v. Kemp, in
which an African-American man convicted of murder and sentenced
to death showed that the race of a murder victim, and to a lesser ex-
tent, of a defendant, statistically affected verdicts to the detriment of
black defendants.62 The defendant provided statistics showing that
among two thousand murder cases tried in Georgia during the 1970s,
black defendants were several times more likely to receive the death
penalty than were white defendants, particularly if the victim was
white.63 The Court held that these statistics alone were not enough to
58. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
59. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96 (1977) (2-to-1 disparity between
Mexican-Americans in county population and those summoned for grand jury duty proved
discriminatory intent); Tamer v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970) (1.6-to-1 disparity be-
tween blacks in county population and those on grand jury lists was a sufficient showing);
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (3-to-1 disparity between eligible blacks in
county and blacks on grand jury venire was a sufficient showing).
60. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960). This case was decided on Fif-
teenth Amendment grounds, not on equal protection grounds. Nonetheless, the Court's
finding of a discriminatory purpose based on a statistical disparity is consistent with my
argument.
61. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
62. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
63. Id. The statistics, compiled by David Baldus, showed that black defendants
charged with killing white persons received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but
defendants charged with killing blacks received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases.
Baldus also found that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving
black defendants and white victims, 32% of the cases involving white defendants and white
victims, 15% of the cases involving black defendants and black victims, and 19% of the
cases involving white defendants and black victims.
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make out an equal protection claim.64 In fact, the court held that even
if the legislature was aware of these racial discrepancies when enacting
death penalty procedures, this still did not necessarily prove a discrim-
inatory intent. Justice White wrote that "'discriminatory purpose' ...
implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of conse-
quences. It implies that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 65
Finally, one recent case involving statistical racial disparities is
relevant to the problem posed in this Note. The Court's 1992 decision
in United States v. Fordice indicates that the equal protection require-
ments can be violated by the maintenance of a program that had its
origins in a purposefully discriminatory action.66 In that case, the
Court considered the statistical evidence of racial segregation in Mis-
sissippi's higher education system: the state's flagship universities had
student populations that were 80 to 91% white, while the three
"black" public universities in the state had student bodies consisting
of 92 to 99% African-Americans. 67 Even though the Court deter-
mined that Mississippi was no longer intentionally segregating these
students, it found an equal protection violation and an affirmative
duty on the state to undo the effects of prior discrimination.68 With
Justice White writing for the majority, the Court held:
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its
prior system [of intentional segregation] that continue to have seg-
regative effects-whether by influencing student enrollment deci-
sions or by fostering segregation in other facets of the university
system-and such policies are without sound educational justifica-
tion and can be practicably eliminated, the State has not satisfied its
burden of proving that it has dismantled its prior system. Such poli-
cies run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, even though the State
has abolished the legal requirement that whites and blacks be edu-
cated separately and has established racially neutral policies not
animated by a discriminatory purpose.69
Thus, under McCleskey, Fordice, and the other Supreme Court
precedents involving a statistical showing of racial disparity, in order
to make out a successful equal protection claim a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the legislature's action was "at least in part because
64. ld. at 297-99.
65. Id. at 298 (quoting Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)).
66. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 718 (1992).
67. Id. at 725. Seventy-one percent of the state's black students attended Jackson
State, Alcom State, or Mississippi Valley State.
68. Id. at 744 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69. Ia- at 731-32.
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of" the discriminatory effects that it would have on a group.70 The
statistical disparities can then reinforce the showing of purposeful dis-
crimination.71 Finally, the maintenance of a policy shown to have dis-
criminatory effects can violate equal protection even if later
modifications to the law are enacted without discriminatory purpose.72
The legislative history of the Social Security Act strongly reflects
racial animus, as this Note will show below in Part UiB. This fact,
when coupled with the continuing adverse effects on African-Ameri-
cans, brings the Act under the ambit of the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence mandating strict scrutiny.73
B. Addressing the Social Security Racial Discrepancy Under the Current
Equal Protection Framework
(1) The Legislative History of the Social Security Act
In enacting the Social Security Act of 1935, Congress was doubt-
less acting primarily out of concern for the financial situation of older
Americans, a dire situation made worse by the Great Depression.74
However, the details of the Act were the subject of great debate. A
complete history of the 1935 legislation is beyond the scope of this
Note, but a few illustrations of this debate indicate that racism played
a significant role in the design of the program. Southern congressmen
were opposed to federal encroachment on the states' ability to set
their own standards for determining benefits and to differentiate
among individuals in whatever manner the states considered reason-
able.75 In particular, the southern delegation was averse to providing
any aid to African-Americans. 76 Edwin E. Witte, the Executive Di-
rector of the Committee on Economic Security in 1934-35, has written
that "[t]he southern members did not want to give authority to anyone
in Washington to deny aid to any state because it discriminated
against negroes in the administration of old age assistance. '77
70. McKlesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
71. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241-42.
72. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 731-32.
73. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 518 U.S. - , 115 S. Ct. 2097,2113 (1995)
(holding that all racial classifications, whether imposed by local, state, or federal govern-
ment, must be analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard).
74. For a summary of Congress' concerns in enacting the Social Security Act, see J.
Cardozo's opinion in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 634-46 (1937).
75. See statement of Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia in the House Hear-
ings on the Act, reported in STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNIrrED STATES: SOCI.i. SECUR-
rry 124-25 (Robert B. Stevens, ed. 1970).
76. See EDWIN E. WrrrE, Tir DEVELOPMENT OF THE SocIAL SECURITY Acr 144
(1963).
77. IL
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The Jackson (Mississippi) Daily News editorialized, "The average
Mississippian can't imagine himself chipping in to pay pensions for
able-bodied negroes to sit around in idleness on front galleries, sup-
porting all their kinfolks on pensions, while cotton and corn crops are
crying for workers to get them out of the grass."' 78 Senator Byrd of
Virginia, a member of the Senate Finance Committee in 1935, voiced
a concern shared by nearly all the southern delegation on the Social
Security committees that the measure might serve as an "entering
wedge" for federal interference with the handling of "the Negro ques-
tion" in the South.79 Edwin Witte, whose committee was largely re-
sponsible for drafting the Act, writes that due to the southern
resistance, "it was apparent that the bill could not be passed as it
stood," given the inclusion of African-Americans in the program.80
During the Senate Hearings on the bill, National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People representative Charles H. Hous-
ton urged passage of the bill in its original form while acknowledging
the difficulties in getting any southern congressmen to vote for a bill
"if Negroes are to benefit from it in any large measure."81 Neverthe-
less, in order to procure the necessary support of the southern legisla-
tors, substantial modifications to the bill were made before the final
vote which adversely affected African-Americans in ways that con-
tinue to the present.
The Act omitted from coverage agricultural and domestic work-
ers, excluding 3.5 million of 5.5 million African-American workers.82
This was despite-or because of-testimony before the House Com-
mittee on Labor that "[p]ractically 85% of the Negroes in the South
are agricultural workers. '83 In addition, the southern opposition
forced a compromise that returned much of the control over Social
Security to the states. 4 This allowed the states to include racially dis-
criminatory practices in the administration of the program. For exam-
78. WILLIAM LEUCHTENBERG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-
1940 131 (1963). See also Stevens, supra note 75, at 124-25 (statement of Representative
Howard W. Smith at the House hearings on the Act: "To put [an elderly African-Ameri-
can] on a pension at 65 of $30 a month is not only going to take care of him, but a great
many of his dependents, relatives, and so on, who could much better be employed working
on a farm.").
79. WrrrE, supra note 76, at 143-44.
80. Id. at 144.
81. Stevens, supra note 75, at 122.
82. See Economic Security Act Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 644 (1935) (statement of Charles H. Houston of the NAACP).
83. Unemploymenl Old Age and Social Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 2822 Before the
House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1935) (statement of Manning Johnson
of the League of Struggle for Negro Rights). See also David R. Francis, Why the Black-
White Wealth Gap Is So Big, CMRSTAN SCI. MON., July 28, 1995, at 9.
84. WrrrE, supra note 76, at 144.
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pie, many Social Security programs in the South operated under "the
assumption that the Standard of living of the Negro and his cost of
living do not rise above the barest subsistence. s85 Consequently,
"there was a tendency to grant lower sums, especially in the South, to
aged blacks than to aged whites. '8 6
Amendments to the Act which Congress later passed exacerbated
these direct, intentional adverse effects on African-American workers.
For example, while in 1939 Congress added spouse and widow bene-
fits to those (largely white) workers who were covered under the Act,
the majority of occupations in which African-Americans were em-
ployed remained excluded from coverage.87
Finally, the choice of age 65 as the threshold for eligibility for
retirement benefits in 1935 reflected a disregard for an already stark
discrepancy in life expectancies between African-Americans and
whites at the time. While 52.9 percent of white male and 60.5% of
white female Americans could be expected to reach this retirement
age and start collecting benefits, only 29.3% of male and 30.8% of
female African-Americans could do so.88 Thus, even for those Afri-
can-Americans who worked in areas that were covered under the So-
cial Security Act, 70% could expect to die before receiving a single
benefit check. 89
(2) The Lasting Effects of the Discriminatory Purposes of the Social
Security Act
In Washington v. Davis, the seminal case requiring a showing of
intentional race discrimination to mount an equal protection chal-
lenge, the Supreme Court noted that "the basic equal protection prin-
ciple [is] that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose."90 In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court described the type of
showing that would suffice to establish a discriminatory purpose war-
ranting strict scrutiny of a statute: that the legislature selected or reaf-
firmed a particular course of action, at least in part, because of its
85. F. Davis, The Effects of the Social Security Act upon the Status of the Negro 157
(1939) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation quoted in Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair
Labor Standards Ac Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1335, 1365-
66 (1987)). See also Stevens, supra note 75, at 124-25 (statement of Representative How-
ard W. Smith at the House hearings on the Act).
86. J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMiERIcANs
354 (6th ed. 1988).
87. 53 Stat. 1362 (1939).
88. Dep't of Health, Ed., and Welfare; Nat'l Office of Vital Statistics, Vital Statistics of
the United States (annual).
89. The committees holding hearings on the 1935 Act had extensive actuarial tables at
their disposal. See WrrTE, supra note 76, at 144-45.
90. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
November 1996] SOCIAL SECURITY DISCRIMINATION
adverse effect on an identifiable group.91 Justice Powell noted in Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. that a plaintiff need
only show "that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating fac-
tor" in the legislation.92 It is not necessary to show that the racial
discrimination was "the 'dominant' or 'primary"' purpose.93 While
this Note does not argue that the current revisions of the Social Secur-
ity Act have been maintained with any intention of disadvantaging
African-Americans, the original design of the Act, as noted in Part
IIB(1), clearly reflect that congressional racial enmity was a "motivat-
ing factor."
Justice White, speaking for eight members of the Court in United
States v. Fordice, spelled out the rule regarding lasting racially discrim-
inatory effects stemming from prior discriminatory purposes in
legislation:
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its
prior system that continue to have segregative effects.., and such
policies are without sound... justification and can be practicably
eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden of proving that it
has dismantled its prior system. Such policies run afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause.94
Fordice concerned the lasting effects of segregation in higher edu-
cation and held Mississippi's university system to be in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.95 The Social
Security Act is similar to the situation in Fordice in that it has its ori-
gins in purposeful racial discrimination, and the effects of that discrim-
ination linger to the present. 96
While it might be argued that the discriminatory effect of the cur-
rent Social Security system-originating in life expectancy differ-
ences-has little to do with the discriminatory intentions of the
original Act, the Fordice Court did not require the lingering effect to
be identical to the original, intended effect in order to violate equal
91. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 298.
92. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. at 265-66.
93. ld. at 265. See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622 (1982), in which the Court
ordered the dismantling of an at-large system of voting that had the effect of keeping Afri-
can-Americans from office, even though the system was originally designed with no dis-
criminatory purpose. The Court held that even though the system was "racially neutral
when adopted, [it] is being maintained for invidious purposes" which is a violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
94. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 731. Fordice is particularly relevant because
it concerns the rights of African-Americans as a group rather than as individuals. Compare
L.A. Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (holding that Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was concerned with protecting individuals and that
group generalizations are no defense).
95. See supra notes 66-69.
96. See supra notes 24-35.
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protection. The Court specifically criticized Mississippi for continuing
to maintain all eight of its state universities, observing that this perpet-
uated a discriminatory effect by giving the races more opportunities to
segregate themselves than would be the case with a smaller number of
schools. This was frowned upon even though the original purpose for
opening so many schools was to comply with state laws which forbade
interracial commingling. 97 Although the actual effect had changed
from the original discriminatory purpose, the university system never-
theless violated the equal protection guarantee.
The only remaining inquiry under Fordice and the other equal
protection cases noted above is whether the racially discriminatory
provisions of the Social Security Act are without "sound justification"
and can be "practicably eliminated."98 The justification that Congress
would most likely offer for applying the same retirement age require-
ments to all races is that the practice is easier to administer than an
alternative. However, the Court has disavowed ease of implementa-
tion as a valid rationale for maintaining a racially discriminatory pro-
gram in a number of contexts. 99 In Richmond v. .A. Croson, for
example, the Court struck down a Richmond, Virginia ordinance
granting preferential treatment to minority building contractors. 100
Justice O'Connor rejected the city's claim that administrative conven-
ience supported a fixed quota, noting that "the interest in avoiding the
bureaucratic effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who
truly have suffered the effects of prior discrimination cannot justify a
rigid line drawn on the basis of a suspect classification."''1 A number
of possible modifications to the Social Security Act would "practicably
eliminate" the discriminatory effects of the program. These modifica-
tions are discussed below in Part III.
In sum, purposeful racial discrimination in large part motivated
the enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935 and its subsequent
amendments. The discriminatory effects continue to the present.
There is no satisfactory government justification for the maintenance
of the program as it currently stands, and there are a number of func-
tional alternatives which would alleviate the discriminatory effects.
Therefore, under the equal protection framework established by the
Court, the Social Security Act is unconstitutional as violative of the
97. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 741-42. The Court also noted with disapproval the different
ACT score requirements among the state universities and the adverse impact these differ-
ences had on desegregation, even though these scores currently were not chosen for any
improper purpose. Id. at 733-38.
98. Id. at 731.
99. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989); Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
100. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 469.
101. Id. at 508.
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equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
IL Legislative Response to the Discriminatory Effect
The racially discriminatory effects of the Social Security Act enu-
merated infra in Part I could also be alleviated by the United States
Congress without resorting to judicial interference. In fact, this may
be the preferable method of confronting the problem as any such solu-
tion would have the stamp of approval of the majority-elected polit-
ical body.
This section proposes a number of remedies to the problem.
First, it outlines a race-based solution and discusses the legal conse-
quences. Second, it summarizes a number of race-neutral modifica-
tions to the Social Security Act that would rectify the problem.
A. A Race-Based Congressional Response
The most straightforward response that Congress could take to-
ward remedying the discriminatory effects of Social Security would be
to amend the Act using race-specific means. A number of commenta-
tors have suggested some possibilities. Columnist Walter Williams
proposes that Congress "race-norm" Social Security. 10 2 Under this
proposal, African-American males would become eligible for retire-
ment benefits at age 56 rather than age 65, so that both white and
African-American males would average eight years of benefits.10 3
Jacquelyne Johnson Jackson has also recommended taking into ac-
count the mortality rates and life expectancies of different races in
determining Social Security taxes and benefits.1°4 Conservative com-
mentator Pat Buchanan has argued that participation in the Social Se-
curity program should be voluntary for African-Americans given that
their shorter life expectancies cheat them of benefits. 0 5
As a threshold matter, Congress has the authority to alter the
benefits of all individuals presently covered under the Social Security
102. Williams, supra note 27.
103. Id. Williams did not mention the discrepancies as applied to African-American
females.
104. Jackson, supra note 28. Dr. Jackson first proposed such a solution in 1968, but no
longer supports this remedy. She argues instead for transforming Social Security into a
true insurance program that would ensure monetary benefits for the estates of all Ameri-
cans who do not live long enough to recoup their Social Security taxes. See infra notes 135-
137.
105. Hanchette, supra note 30. Note the irony in that the original drafters of the 1935
Social Security Act excluded African-Americans from coverage in order to treat them un-
fairly. Given the likelihood that today's younger workers will fail to recover anything close
to the taxes they are paying, some now want to exclude African-Americans from the pro-
gram in order to benefit them. See, e.g., Church & Lacayo, supra note 4, at 24.
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Act.10 6 If Congress were to modify the benefit schedules to eliminate
the discriminatory impact on African-Americans, other persons could
not complain since Congress, when enacting the original Social Secur-
ity Act, expressly reserved "[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any
provision" of the Act. 0 7
While the Social Security Act has never included any facially
race-based provisions, 108 the original Act and a number of subsequent
amendments did contain gender-specific provisions.10 9 Examining the
Supreme Court decisions concerning these provisions sheds some light
on the possible routes Congress could take to alleviate the racial dis-
crimination noted in Part I.
In the 1970s the Supreme Court considered two provisions of the
Social Security Act that were challenged as working to the disadvan-
tage of women, and it consequently struck those provisions. 10 In
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the plaintiff was a widower who sought ben-
efits under the Act based on his deceased wife's earnings."' Under
section 402 of the Act as constructed at that time, however, such survi-
vor benefits were only available to a widow and not to a widower."12
The Court held this section to be in violation of the plaintiff's right to
equal protection, reasoning that "such a gender-based generalization
cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who
do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families'
support."113
Similarly, in Califano v. Goldfarb, the Court struck a provision of
the Act on equal protection and due process grounds." 4 Under this
offending provision, survivor's benefits based on the earnings of a de-
ceased husband were payable to his widow regardless of dependency,
but benefits based on the earnings of a deceased wife were payable to
her widower only if he was receiving at least half of his support from
her." 5 Thus, the rule of these two cases appears to be that Social
106. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-11 (1960).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1995). See also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 321. In addi-
tion, the Fifth Amendment "does not forbid statutory changes to have a beginning and
thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later time." Sperry & Hutchinson
Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502,505 (1911). It follows that Congress may replace one constitu-
tionally sound computation formula with another.
108. However, the history of the Act indicates that a number of provisions were en-
acted with a racially discriminatory purpose. See supra notes 74-89.
109. See infra notes 110-121.
110. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977).
111. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 639.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970 & Supp. HI).
113. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645.
114. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1) (1970 & Supp. V).
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Security provisions that work to the disadvantage of women will be
held to violate the equal protection clause.
This rule does not apply to provisions which work in favor of wo-
men, however. In Califano v. Webster, the Court considered a chal-
lenge by a male plaintiff to a section of the Act which calculated the
benefits due to a man differently from those due to a woman. 116
Under this provision a woman could exclude from the computation of
her "average monthly wage" fourteen low earning years, whereas a
similarly situated man could exclude only eleven; this resulted in a
slightly higher "average monthly wage" and correspondingly higher
monthly old-age benefits for retired women.1 7 The Court upheld the
statute because it "operated directly to compensate women for past
economic discrimination.""118 Since women have been historically ex-
cluded from higher-earning jobs, the Court reasoned, this section of
the Act "works directly to remedy some part of the effect of past dis-
crimination" and is therefore not violative of the male plaintiff's equal
protection rights.119
One interpretation of these cases suggests that amendments simi-
lar to those detailed above but intended to compensate African-
Americans for historical discrimination in the labor market would also
be upheld. Such provisions would simply favor African-Americans to
compensate for past employment discrimination and current black/
white life-expectancy differences, and they would be constitutionally
sound under Webster. However, under more recent Supreme Court
equal protection analyses of congressional acts, gender-based and
race-based legislative acts are no longer scrutinized under the same
standard. Gender-based statutes such as those considered in this sec-
tion are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny requiring such
classifications to "serve important governmental objectives and [ ] be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."' 20 The
Court had formerly applied this standard to race-based classifications
made by Congress as well under its 1990 decision in Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC.121
In 1995, however, the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena'22 and applied strict scrutiny to
116. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 313-16.
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 415(a), 415(b) (1970 & Supp. V). This section was amended
in 1972 to eliminate this gender-based difference. Pub. L. No. 92-603 (1972) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1995)).
118. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 318.
119. Id.
120. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S at 316-17 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976)).
121. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990).
122. 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
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acts passed by Congress. The Court there held that any such race-
based classifications "must serve a compelling governmental interest,
and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest" in order to
withstand Fifth Amendment equal protection scrutiny.123 Adarand in-
volved a challenge to a minority set-aside program under which mi-
nority businesses were given indirect preferential treatments in
subcontracting for government work.124 The Court did not review the
set-aside program under its new standard, but remanded the case to
the lower courts to review the case under the correct level of
scrutiny.125
Because the Supreme Court has not yet provided distinct guide-
lines under the strict scrutiny standard for congressional acts, it is un-
clear whether a race-based response to the discriminatory impact of
Social Security would withstand judicial review as the gender-based
distinctions have. However, the Court in Adarand did take pains to
refute the idea that strict scrutiny of such legislation was "strict in the-
ory, but fatal in fact."'1 26 Justice Souter, writing in dissent but inter-
preting the majority, pointed out that "constitutional authority to
remedy past discrimination is not limited to the power to forbid its
continuation, but extends to eliminating those effects that would
otherwise persist and skew the operation of public systems even in the
absence of current intent to practice any discrimination."' 27 Justice
Ginsburg similarly noted the "majority's acknowledgment of Con-
gress' authority to act affirmatively, not only to end discrimination,
but also to counteract discrimination's lingering effects."' 2
Therefore, even under Adarand's stricter standard, congressional
action designed to eliminate the severe lingering effects of a Social
Security statute designed at least in part to disfavor African-Ameri-
cans would serve the "compelling governmental interest" required by
Adarand. In addition, such modifications would not run afoul of the
strict scrutiny requirement that they be "narrowly tailored measures"
which do not "trammel unduly upon the opportunities of others or
interfere too harshly with legitimate expectations of persons in once-
preferred groups."' 29 Modifying the benefit schedules for African-
Americans-or even allowing for voluntary participation in the pro-
gram for African-Americans-would not significantly affect the rights
123. Id at 2117.
124. Id. at 2101-04.
125. Id. at 2118.
126. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
127. Id. at 2133 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2135 (Ginsburg, 3., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2136 (Ginsburg, 3., dissenting).
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and benefits of white Americans.130 Therefore, having satisfied all the
requirements necessary to withstand the Court's strict scrutiny, such a
race-based response to the problem would pass constitutional muster.
B. Race-Neutral Congressional Remedies
Congress need not respond to the problem of the racially discrim-
inatory effect of the Social Security Act by resorting to a race-based
remedy which would invoke strict scrutiny by the federal courts. A
number of race-neutral remedies that would effectively eliminate the
discrepancy have been proposed. 13'
The most radical, yet fairest reform as far as the problems engen-
dered by racial life-expectancy differences are concerned, would be to
privatize Social Security, i.e., to transform the program from a govern-
ment insurance program to an individual investment plan. For exam-
ple, the Heritage Foundation has proposed allowing any individuals
who wish to do so to opt out of the current Social Security program
and to receive from the government a check for their contributions to
date.132 These individuals "would then be obliged to invest that
money plus all future contributions that would have otherwise gone
into the Social Security trust fund into a mandatory individual retire-
ment account (IRA)."' 33 The earnings from these investments would
vest in the name of the worker rather than be pooled in the single
trust fund that currently manages Social Security revenues. This
would allow African-Americans, or any other individuals, to collect
their fair share upon retirement or disability, or would at least insure
that their heirs received the accrued benefits. 34
At the other extreme are calls to means-test the program. Under
this scheme, Social Security would be transformed into a true insur-
ance program with mandatory contributions by all workers, as under
the current system, but with benefits going only to those who need
130. It is true that these provisions would engender additional costs to the program
which would be spread throughout society, but these costs would merely make up for the
disproportionate payments into the program that African-Americans have made.
131. There are a number of other reasons for reforming Social Security that are be-
yond the scope of this Note, not the least of which is the threatened insolvency of the
program. For a summary of these concerns see Dorcas R. Hardy & C. Colburn Hardy,
Social Insecurity (1991). For a fuller treatment of the pros and cons of the proposals sug-
gested in this Note, see the sources cited infra in notes 132-140.
132. Church & Lacayo, supra note 4, at 24, 30. See also David Wise, Six Initiatives to
Promote Private Saving, CHALLENGE, Nov., 1992, at 13; Forman, supra note 35, at 949.
133. Church & Lacayo, supra note 4, at 24, 30.
134. See, e.g., Eric Kingson & Jill Quadagno, Social Security: Marketing Radical Re-
form. The Future of Age-Based Public Policy, American Society on Aging, GENERATIONS,
Sept. 22, 1995, at 43; Wise, supra note 132, at 20, 26-27.
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them without regard to an individual's history of payments. 135 This
would convert Social Security into a welfare-type safety net with a
floor of protection guaranteed for all.136 Of course, in order to avoid
the discrepancies detailed in Part I of this Note, the threshold for
means-testing would have to be grounded on some basis other than
age, such as disability or other inability to continue working. 137
Finally, many reformers, including Senators Bob Kerry and John
Danforth, have suggested a two-tier system of Social Security which is
a hybrid of the two proposals mentioned above. Under the Kerry-
Danforth plan, the Social Security tax would be cut, with 4.7% of a
worker's wages being paid into the government trust fund which
would be used to provide a floor of support for all retirees or disabled
elderly.' 38 However, the additional 1.5% of wages that are now going
into the trust fund would be available to invest in a mandatory IRA in
the individual worker's name.1 39 This would give all workers, includ-
ing the 50% who are not currently covered under any type of private
pension plan, an increased pool of private assets which would help to
alleviate the demand for Social Security trust fund benefits. 40
None of these proposals is without its critics, and any fundamen-
tal changes to such an enormous program as Social Security would
require a great deal of study to assess the pros and cons. However,
given the stark racial discrepancies inherent in the current Social Se-
curity program, there is a great need for Congress to enact some type
of reform. In considering any amendments to the Act, Congress must
take into account its inequitable treatment of African-Americans. It
can ameliorate these effects by either an explicit race-based response,
or by a race-neutral response that eliminates the racial discrepancies,
but it must at least consider the effect of any such changes on African-
Americans with their shorter life expectancies. To fail to do so will
135. Peter Peterson, former Secretary of Commerce, has offered one such proposal:
households with annual incomes of more than $35,000 would have their benefits reduced
on a sliding scale starting at 7.5% and going up an additional 5% for every $10,000 of extra
income. At incomes of $185,000 or above, households would thus lose 85% of their bene-
fits. Church & Lacayo, supra note 4, at 24, 30-31. See also Kingson & Quadagno, supra
note 134. Currently, benefits are pegged to an individual's past earnings. See Forman,
supra note 35, at 922.
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simply perpetuate the unconstitutionally discriminatory impact that
the program has produced for the last sixty years.
Conclusion
Social Security has never been an equitable system from the point
of view of African-Americans. While all workers, black and white,
pay into the program at the same rate, the dramatically lower life ex-
pectancies of African-Americans result in their collecting benefits
from the program in proportions far below those of whites.
Much of this racial discrepancy was designed into the Social Se-
curity Act in its original 1935 formulation specifically to disadvantage
African-Americans. Even though such intentional racism may not
have been a factor in some subsequent revisions of the Act, the dis-
criminatory effects linger to the present.
This Note has argued that under the United States Supreme
Court's equal protection framework, particularly as articulated in
Washington v. Davis, McCleskey v. Kemp, and United States v. Fordice,
the Court should apply strict scrutiny to the Act and strike it as viola-
tive of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. This unconstitutionality is
grounded in the racist origins of the Act, the continued disparate ef-
fects on African-Americans, and congressional failure to remedy these
effects.
Additionally, this Note has argued that Congress has the author-
ity under the Supreme Court's equal protection guidelines to amend
the Social Security Act in such a way as to directly alleviate the racial
discrepancies. A number of such race-based remedies are discussed.
Finally, this Note has offered a summary of some race-neutral
means by which Congress could amend the Act that would also rem-
edy the disparate effect on African-Americans. Whatever method
Congress does take in enacting future revisions of the Social Security
Act, it is constitutionally and morally bound not to perpetuate the dis-
criminatory impact that past versions of the Act have wrought.
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